This report is the product of a qualitative survey conducted by KIE organization’s focus group in the span of two months within both the Sulaimany and Halabja governorates. The opinions and information are gathered from asking Mayors, director generals, members of the provincial council, academics and the governors.
Contents of the Report:

*The Plan for the Report’s Preparation

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*Investigating Decentralization in the Laws of Governorates (Legal Framework)

*Presence of Decentralization in the edicts and instructions of Kurdistan Region’s Council of Ministers

  - Mayor’s and director generals’ view.

*The Magnitude of Decentralization in administration

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*The magnitude of fiscal decentralization

  - The Extent Mayor’s and director generals’ expenditure authority

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  - Decentralization and the revenue from the local natural resources

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* The Obstacles to Decentralization in the Kurdistan Region

* The total suggestions of the respondents for Consolidating Decentralization

* The Results

* Suggestions

* The name and address of the respondents of the survey
THE PLANS OF THE REPORT’S PREPARATION:

Five members of our organization’s focus group\(^1\) in October 2016 conducted a qualitative survey about the condition of decentralization within the borders of the Sulaimany and Halabja governorates. For the purpose of the survey, the focus groups held face-to-face interviews with fifteen Mayors, the two supervisors of the two independent administrative units of both Raparin and Garmyan, the deputy governor of Halabja, fourteen governorate director generals from Sulaimany governorate and three director generals from the Halabja governorate, thirteen members of Sulaimany’s governorate council, and two university professors. Each were asked questions corresponding to the nature of their position. The reports strategy required from the supervisor team of the survey to design, based on the proximity the jobs and positions, two different yet complementary bundles of questions: The first bundle of questions was directed at members of the governorate council and university professors since the nature of this first bundle of questions aimed at finding the comparative differences between the legal texts and the prevalent reality. In other words, these questions investigate the laws and legal framework that relates decentralization in the Kurdistan Region. The second bundle of questions was directed at Mayors, director generals, the supervisors of independent administrative units and governors. This bundle necessitates answers that are based of practical, daily and field knowledge. Moreover, these answers scrutinize the impact of the decrees from the Kurdistan Region’s central government on the application of administrative and fiscal decentralization within the institutes and offices of the administrative units.

The members of our focus group, through conversing with the actors and figures of the local institutions of Sulaimany and Halbja, sought to assess the condition of decentralization in the two provinces and to reveal the extent to which decentralization has been applied in the

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\(^1\) The members of the focus groups were (Halsho Abdulfatah, Gmo Mohammed, Karmand Mahmood, Darun Najib and Karwan Nazim).

The report’s supervisor: Aram Jamal, aram.jamal@kie-ng0.org
institutions of the administrative units. This revelation can be noticed from the central government’s recognition of local and zonal interest and the need for providing the people of the local administrative units in the two provinces with public services. Additionally, the answers provided by the heads of the administrative units and director generals disclose how far the local institutions have succeeded at evading the webs and networks, composed of public employment, administration and fiscal administration, established by the central government, situated in the capital city Arbil.

The Aim of the Survey:
* Exposing the impediments to administrative and fiscal decentralization within the legal texts and the legislative structure of the Kurdistan Region.
* The extent to which administrative and fiscal decentralization among the institutions of the capital city and the apparatus of the Halabja and Sulaimany provinces.

The Implications of Decentralization in the Kurdistan Region:
In the Kurdistan region, centralization has had a number of implications, which could be perceived at as both a beginning and a chance for establishing the foundations of the decentralization system and downplaying the heritage of centralization in our administrative system. The implications are:

First: The Legal Framework:
- Law number 3 of (2009), Law of Kurdistan Region’s provinces.
- Law number 4 of (2009), Law of electing provincial, district and sub-district’s councils in Kurdistan Region.
- The instructions and decrees of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional.
- The Law Number 1 of (2015), Law of Halabja province administration in Kurdistan region-Iraq.
- The decree number 1 of (2015), the decree of the nominations and recognition of Mayors and the administrators of districts in the Kurdistan-Iraq, released in the fourth round of Kurdistan’s Parliament.
Second: The holding of the provincial council’s elections of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Third: The elected provincial councils of the Kurdistan Region’s provinces.

Fourth: The elected governors amid the elected provincial councils of the provinces.

Fifth: The recognition of the heads of the local administrative units (Mayors and district directors) by the provincial councils, according to the decrees 5, 7, and 17 of the year 2015 of the Sulaimany provincial council.

Sixth: The recognition of the director generals of the ministers by the provincial councils, according to the decrees 6 and 14 of the year 2015 of the Sulaimany provincial council.
INVESTIGATING OF DECENTRALIZATION WITHIN THE PROVINCIAL LAWS (LEGAL FRAMEWORK):

In order to establish whether centralized or decentralized the structure of the administrative system of a state or region is, it is essential that we should, initially, investigate the constitutional and legal texts, instructions and decree pertaining to this topic. The Kurdistan region still lacks a constitution. Nonetheless, Kurdistan Region’s provincial laws, law number three of the year 2009, framed after the second provincial elections, determines the structure of the administrative system. This law has been in effect and has been used since then. The members of our focus group, through conversing with 14 provincial council members of the Sulaimany province of the first and second tenures and two university professors, attempted to uncover how far the provincial laws, in effect for two years now, embody the application of decentralization.

The provincial councils of the Sulaimany province, in an answer to what extent the provincial laws of the Kurdistan region have allowed for the foundations of fiscal and administrative decentralization, opined and emphasized that the laws allow little room for fiscal and administrative decentralization and that in practice; even this little does not exist. There is particular evidence for that *The Kurdistan Regional Government is not willing to share the powers granted to the provincial councils by the provincial laws.

* The provincial council lacks its own administrative structure and accounting unit.
* The provincial council does not have its own “Public Employees” and all of its clerks are dealt with as employees of the ministry of interior, similar to the rest of provincial employees, on the administrative level, are counted as the employees of the provincial bureaus, which belongs to the Kurdistan Region’s ministry of interior.
The hierarchical structure of the Kurdistan Region’s Ministries
HE APPEARANCE OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE DECREES OF THE KURDISTAN MINISTERS' COUNCIL:

(Mayors and director generals):

For the remainder of this investigation, our group attempts to establish the contemporary provincial laws as the foundations of this report since, in the light of the provincial laws, one could discern how far decentralization is reflected in the decrees and instructions issues by the presidency of Kurdistan Region’s council of minister at different times. To accomplish this, our focus interviewed 15 Mayors from the Sulaimany and Halabja provinces, 17 director generals from both provinces, the two heads of the Garmyan and Raparin independent administrations, and two deputy governorates.

On 17th October 2012, the presidency of the council of ministers issued two decrees numbered (11231) and (11232). These two decrees allowed for the devolution of administrative and fiscal authority downwards to provinces, independent administrative units and director generals. These two decrees contain a substantial amount of decentralization. However, on 17th April, 2016, the presidency of the Kurdistan Region’s council of ministers issued a decreed numbered 1700, which abrogated the aforementioned decrees numbered (11231 and 11232).

In 2013, the presidency of the council of ministers issued three other decrees (decree number 40, issued on 16th January 2013 alongside decrees number 33 and 45, issue on 19th June 2013). The three decrees delegated fiscal and administrative authorities to the provinces, independent administrative units and the directorates endowed with directorate generals within the ministerial bureaus. Yet, on 10th of May 2016, the prime minister issued another verdict numbered 2062, which dismantled all the three verdicts.

Concerning the significance of dismantling the five decrees and its impact on the functioning of their departments and the administrative and fiscal repercussions, our focus group members interviewed 19 interviewees, composed of 15 Mayors, the two heads of independent
administrations and two deputy governorates. In general, the answers followed along the following lines:

First: All of the Mayors and director generals, as an answer to our questions, point out to the contradiction and incompatibility between the decrees numbered 1700 and 2061 of the Kurdistan Regional Government, issued in 2016, and the core of Kurdistan Region’s provincial law number three of the year 2009.

Second: The Mayors and director generals involved in the survey noted that the foundations and elements of centralization are prevalent in the instructions and decrees of the government as opposed to the provincial laws of the Kurdistan Region.

Third: The majority of the respondents demonstrated the negative and harmful consequences of the abrogation of the five decrees on the smooth fiscal and administrative operations of their departments, and the consequences could be illustrated in the following lines:

- Abrogating the decrees has meant that the Mayors and director generals, in order to carry out the functions of their departments, need to refer back to the council of ministers or their respective ministry, and that has increased routines and has hindered the process of decision making because answering their requests costs more and takes more times, so the people heading to those administrative units, mainly, pay the price for such delays.

- Revoking the decrees has constrained the hands of the heads of the administrative units and director generals; hence, their authority is so diminished that they are prevented from executing their administrative duty and tasks, such as allocating and transferring employees according to the necessity of their departments and to fill the needs of their needs.

- Due to the abolishment of the decrees, fiscal and expenditure authority has been taken away from the heads of the administrative units and director generals. As an example, For them to obtain an amount of money for the operation of their departments, they need formal permission from the ministry of finance and economy. The will either reply very late or they will deny their request. Consequently, this has impeded their operation of their departments.
- Due to the annulment of the decrees, the administrative authorities, such as the transfer, allocation and promotion of their government employees. They have also been stripped from the power to express gratitude and thanks, and that has obstructed them from carrying out their tasks.

*Ali Osman Ali (Halabja Deputy Governorate):

The abrogation of the decrees has had negative consequences on the operations of their governorate. It may lead to negative consequences for the other three governorates, but its effects are much more significant for the Halabja governorate because it is a newly founded governorate. They should have excluded Halabja governorate from stripping the governorates from their powers.

Some scenes from the qualitative research interviews
THE EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

(The Heads of the Administrative Units):

“What is the magnitude of your administrative authority as related to the authorities to transfer and allocate government employees and expressing thanks and gratitude?” was a question we asked the heads of the administrative units within the borders of the Sulaimany province.

Out of fifteen respondents, ten Mayors and the head of the Raparin administration replied that they lack such authority and that it has been six months since they have been stripped of the authority to allocate and transfer employees, and they cannot even express thanks and gratitude, at a time when they have received no additional authorities. Even though the ministry of interior has issued the order number 12 of the years 2016, which allocates some authority to Mayors, but it is yet to be applied on the whole. These Mayors disclosed that they had the authority to allocate and transfer employees and to express thanks and gratitude prior to now. One of the Mayors said, “Our job has been turned into one of coordination, coordination between the government and the people. The people of our locale demand, and we delegate that to the ministries because we, as Mayors, lack the authority to answer the wishes of the people.”

Of all the interviewees, three Mayors and Halabja’s deputy governor deem their authority to be too little. The evidence includes their lack of authority to allocate employees within their departments, not to mention between departments or organs. The Halabja deputy governor said that currently as a governor he has been deprived of the authority to transfer employees, but he has the authority to allocate up to four degree employees.

- (Director Generals):

Our focus group asked 14 general directors in the Sulaimany province and three director generals of the Halabja province the same question, concerning their administrative authority of allocating, promoting, and transferring employees and expressing thanks and gratitude. The answers were as following:

Ten director generals said that they possess the authority to allocate and transfer employees within their departmental locale, but they lack the authority to transfer and allocate from their directorate to another directorate. The ministry has such authority.

It is to be pointed out that the directorates to whom such authority has been delegated are those mostly whose services earn revenues for the Kurdistan Regional government. For
example, the director general of the International Sulaimany Airport says that he, to a limited degree, has the authority to promote the employees of his directorate. In much the same way, the directorate general of electricity possesses the same authority whereas the directorate of jobs and social affairs does not have the authority to promote employees.

*Seven director generals claim that they have NO such administrative authority and that they can only suggest to their superiors. This is so by virtue of strong emphasis on centralization and the annulment of the decrees number (40,44,45,12231 and 11232) coupled with a financial crisis in the Kurdistan Region.

Some scenes of the annulment decentralization decrees in the Iraqi Kurdistan region

The Head of the Raparin Independent administration: When it comes to oil, we have no authority. Our only task is to provide protection to the companies extracting oil in our areas.
The Extent of the Application of Fiscal Decentralization:

The Mayors’ and Director Generals’ Expenditure Authority:

“To what extent do the Mayors and director generals have the authority to spend to execute the operations of their departments, to attend to their fiscal needs and to listen to the services needs by the people of their administrative unit locales?” was a question we asked Mayors and general directors. Their responses provided the following results:
* Currently, they do not have a budget to even delve into the matter of fiscal authority, and the peoples’ demands, if related to financial matters, cannot be attended to and that they can only, in an official writing, send a request to their superiors. Then they are not sure whether their calls will be answered or not.
* To manage their affairs and attend to their expenditure, they are in possession of only one bonus, which was reduced after the financial crisis.
* The bonus in the hands of any Mayor within the borders of the Sulaimany province is 1 million and 150 thousand Iraqi Dinars in the best-case scenario. They say that this is too little and that it does not suffice to cover the costs of the Mayor bureau, fuel for their cars and hosting guests.
* All of the stress the point that they lack substantial fiscal authority. They cannot provide the smallest service needed by the people of their administrative locale.

The Expenditure Authority of the Total Revenues of the Administrative Units:

There can no country or region found around the globe whose total revenue is based on only on area, but rather, the revenues of any region or country, whatever it is, more or less is from different areas of the country. Our focus group tried to answer the question, “To what extent the revenues, extracted from customs, airports, water, electricity, health, housing taxes and traffic violations, have been used for the development of their areas and for providing services?” The following are the results our focus group reached to from the answers provided by the Mayors:

* A decree from the council of ministers, issued in 2016, requires that all revenue from provinces are to be transferred to the ministry of finance to be added to the public budget. A specific percentage of the revenues will be given to some of the respective departments so as to attend to the needs of their department and projects.

* The money earned from traffic violation fees, customs, housing taxes, water, electricity and health are all sent back to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s treasury in the Kurdistan Bank. The central Mayor of Sulaimany, in the year 2015, earned 217 million dinars due to violations in public places, compiled through receipts. However, all of the
money had to be sent to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s treasury, all the while the Mayor lacking the authority to spend even one dinar.

Decentralization and the Revenues From Local Natural Resources:

It is known that the provinces of Sulaimany and Halabja some districts are endowed with oil, gas and metals while some others are not. Concerning the authority over and relation of the administrative heads to the processes of extracting, refining and marketing of the oil and gas, all the Mayors of the Sulaimany province say:
* They lack any authority to decide on the extraction of metals and gas and petrol energy, their marketing or even their revenues. The Ministry of Natural Resources possess a monopoly over the natural resources. As an instance, Penjwin has thirteen different type of above-ground and beneath-ground metals (like marbles and ironstone). As of now, three companies are involved in the extraction of ironstone. The Penjwin Mayor says, “I am in no way aware of how the local resource is being marketed, and that is due to the fiscal policy of the Kurdistan Regional Government, which has deemed that everything has to be done through the ministry of natural resources.”
* Some of the Mayors claim that their knowledge of their local resources extends to the number of refineries and the spots where oil is extracted. Some of the Mayors in certain districted have formed committees so as to delegate their daily needs through these committees.
* Up to 2013, an amount of money from oil revenues, dubbed as petrodollar or the oil budget, was allocated to the areas for development, but ever since the financial crisis started, that budget has been cut and the heads of the administrative units cannot provide any type of services and projects to their areas.

The Benefits of the Oil and Gas companies for the People:

* Within the borders of the Halabja province, there exists only one company, namely Gazprom. It is searching for oil wells. The agreement, reached with the Kurdistan Regional Government, dictates that the company allocate 50 million dollars for the Halbja province. The allocated money is to be spent for the development of the putative province according to a plan designed by a committee on a provincial level. Aside from that, the heads of Halabja’s administrative units are not involved closely or from a far and lack the authority over the processes of the extracting, refining and marketing oil and gas. The Ministry of Natural Resources is the sole authority over the processes.

* There is a law that prescribes there be local engineers and worker hired by the oil and gas companies extracting above-ground and beneath-ground energy resources. This is yet to be implemented since the engineers and workers hired by the company are foreigners, not locals.
* Some Mayors claim that not only no benefit has been received from these companies, but that their roads are also destroyed due to the movement of oil tankers!

**Obstructions to Decentralization in the Kurdistan Region**

* The hegemony of political parties over the government and the lack of belief in decentralization on the side of the parties in the coalition government.

* All authority has been condensed within the council of ministers and after those ministers. This has meant that for the execution of their fiscal and administrative affairs, they have to revert back to the central government in the capital.

* A distrust in the heads of the administrative units on the side of the central government even though it has issues governmental decrees for them.

* The weakness of the parliament and laws in implementing decentralization.

* The provincial councils and the heads of the administrative units have not been granted real authority.

* The absence of independent accounting units within the administrative units. It is mixed with the provincial accounting units.

* The existence of a self-assertive center that only seeks its own interest.

* The existence of a robust infrastructure of centralization in the last 25 years.

* Interpreting decentralization as means for dividing the Kurdistan Region

* The government does not confide in the party cadres who have entered the administrations and have secured positions for themselves.

* The institutions of the government are not systematic but rather whimsical. As an example, if a Mayor requests money be spent to his district from his superiors, his request is often refused. Nonetheless, if a party cadre requests twice as much to be spent for himself, then his wish is granted. Additionally, if the head of an administrative unit has a more solid and better relation to his superior, then he can easily carry get his things done. It is illogical to have a Mayor and above him a shadow Mayor.
THE RESPONDENTS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRENGTHENING DECENTRALIZATION:

* A decree from the presidency of the council of ministers for devolving administrative and fiscal authority to Kurdistan Region’s administrative is to be issued. This helps the people and eases the burden on the shoulder of the central government.

* The law no.3 of the year 2009 of Kurdistan Region’s provincial laws is to be fully implemented. Then, the articles and parts whose implementation has unveiled them to be obstructing decentralization are to be amended.

* The instructions are to be released in the light of the legal framework. At times, instructions burden both the people and the heads of the administrative units.

* Trust has to be built amongst the different political sides so that the misconception that decentralization leads to the disintegration of the Kurdistan Region is rectified.

* What the people consider paramount currently is administrative decentralization, and fiscal decentralization is to be addressed later if need be.

* Decentralization is to be implemented in an experimental manner within some ministries, and then it is to be gradually incorporated into other ministries. To take an example, the Iraqi government carried out decentralization within the ministries providing public services. The Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Municipalities could be the first place where decentralization is installed.

* Working transparently in levying taxes and with revenues generally and oil revenues in particular.

* A portion of the administrative units’ revenues, such as taxes, customs or revenues from natural resources, should be spent to fill the needs of the administrative units. In other words, fiscal decentralization is to be instituted so that the incompetency of the officials is revealed.

* It is not necessary for expressing thanks and gratitude or a number of other administrative affairs we refer back to our superior. If there is administrative decentralization, then managerial routines are minimized and things can get done smoothly.

* The present administrative system outdated and the system of files and drawers is still in effect. It is imperative that the administrative system be turned into an electronic system.
* Approving the constitution and embedding the foundations of decentralization in it.

* Starting awareness sessions and training for the heads of the administrative units regarding managerial etiquettes and accounting and administrative system.

* The spirit of competition has to be established between the administrative units of the Kurdistan Region should there be fiscal and administrative decentralization in effect. This, on the one hand, serves the local people and it exposes the incompetent units. The people, later on during elections, can hold the heads of the administrative units accountable and question them.

**REPORT RESULTS:**

* The research demonstrates that the great majority of the elements of decentralization, ingrained in the Kurdistan Region’s provincial laws, particularly law no.3 of the year 2009, has not been practically manifested for the purpose of achieving fiscal and administrative decentralization. In fact, it persists only in theory and as ink on the paper. Not holding elections for the administrative units of the districts and sub-districts testified to this belief.

* The research exhibits in spite of the provincial council elections being held, any level of local governance that could translate the demands of the people into public service projects remains to be seen yet. The administrative units seem to be extensions of the government to merely carry out the tasks the central government decides on in their own respective geography. It is not the devolution or division of discretion or responsibility between the capital and the administrative units.

* The research demonstrates that the curve of fiscal and administrative decentralization in the Kurdistan Region is at a low level and it is receding still further. After the financial crisis, decentralization receded back to a great degree and we are gradually regressing to the solid ministerial centralization. The Kurdistan Regional Government should have strengthened decentralization as the key and a chance for solving the financial crisis.

* The Kurdistan Regional Government’s decree and instructions are not issued within the framework or in the light of the law no.3 of the year 2009, in effect after the elections of 30th April, 2014, of the provincial laws. The foundations of decentralization are much more prevalent in the decrees and instructions as opposed to the law itself.

Rauf Kamal,
The Mayor of Qaradagh:
Chevron, the company which operated in our area, provided the local farmer with three buses, 60 bee cells, vehicles for cleaning refining wheat, and two generators.
* The directorates who have the authority to allocate, transfer and allocate employees and express thanks and gratitude are increasingly those whose services earn the government revenue as opposed to the directorates, involved in services related to intellectualism, arts, education, and religion, that do not earn the government revenues. This is an indication of the absence of a united managerial system in the Kurdistan Region.

**THE RECOMMENDATIONS:**

* Fiscal and administrative authority and responsibility is to be transferred from the central government to the administrative units so that the administrative units can plan annually for themselves and to make decisions related to provide services for the units.

* The government is to create replacements for the annulled laws (numbers 11231 and 11232) and (40, 44, and 45) so that at least the minimal fiscal and administrative authorities that they had is returned to the director generals and heads of the administrative units.

* In the constitution or the law number 3 of the provinces of the Kurdistan region, the exclusive powers of the central government or council or local governments is to be installed.

* Fiscal and administrative authority be handed over to the administrative heads and director generals in return for committees and monitoring institutions over the departments be solidified.

* The areas where metals, oil and gas is extracted are to be handed over a portion over their revenues to dedicate them for environmental projects, roads, hospitals and the areas’ electricity.

* A law for fiscal equilibrium between the central government and administrative units is to be framed so that an independent budgeted, proportional to their population’s size, is provided for the development of the provinces.
The Names and Titles of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Names</th>
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| Director Generals in Halabja Sulaimany | 17 | *Omar Mohammed: The Director General of the social affairs in Sulaimany  
*Abdulrahman Salh Rashid: The Director General of Kurdistan Region’s Banks in Sulaimany  
*Yasin Faqe Mohammed: Director General of tourism  
*Tahir Abdullah Qadir: Director General of the Sulaimany Airport  
*Parwin Amin Mohammed: Depute General Director of Education in Sulaimany  
*Babakr Drayyi: Director General of Intellectualism, Arts, Sports and Youth of Sulaimany.  
*Faraydun Gharib Hasan: The Director General of Religious Affairs and Endowments of Sulaimany  
*Bahadin Ibrahim Fars: Director General of Sulaimany’s Municipalities  
*Ibrahim Aziz Ahmad: Director General of Roads and Construction  
*Yousif Yasin Mohammed: Director of Sulaimany’s Municipality.  
*Salar Husam al-Din Salih: Director general of Electricity of Sulaimany  
*Farman Gharib Sa’yid: Director General of Investment in Sulaimany  
*Shalaw Jamal Rasul: Director General of Agriculture in Sulaimany  
*Baha al-Din Mohammed Abdulrahman: Director General of Martyrs and Anfal Victims in Sulaimany  
*Hunar Ja’far Rashid: Deputy Director General of Health in Halabja  
*Hasan Rashid Mohammed: Director General of Halabja’s Municipalities.  
*Parwez Nyazi Askandar: Director General of Intellectualism in Halabja |
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<th><strong>Members of Sulaimany’s Provincial Council</strong></th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>The Heads of the District Administrative Units (Mayors)</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Bakhtyar Abdulrahman: The Mayor of the central Sulaimany District</td>
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<td>*Nuksha Nasih: The Mayor of Halabja’s central district</td>
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<td>*Bakr Bayiz: The Mayor of the Psbdar District</td>
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<td>*Hiwa Qarany Abdullah: The Mayor of the Ranyah District</td>
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<td>*Rizgar Ghafoor: The Mayor of the Sharazur District</td>
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<td>*Dyar Rafiq: The Mayor of the Sayid Sadiq District</td>
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<td>*Zana Abdulrahman: The Mayor of the Penjwin District</td>
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<td>*Shahab Ahmad: The Mayor of the Kalar District</td>
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<td>*Adnan Kakarash: The Mayor of the Sharbazher District</td>
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<td>*Kamaran Hasan: The Mayor of the Mawat District</td>
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<td>*Mohammed Nasih: The Mayor of the Darbandikhan District</td>
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<td>*Amanj Kasas: The Mayor of the Chamchaml District</td>
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<td>*Aso Bakr Mustafa: The Mayor of the Dukan District</td>
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<td>*Jalal Jury Abdulqadr: The Mayor of the Kifri District</td>
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<td>*Rauf Kamal Sa’id: The Mayor of the Qaradagh District</td>
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<th><strong>University Professors</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>*Dr. Mustafa Rasul Hussien: Executive of the Law Department</td>
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<td>*Dr. Kawa Mohammed Faraj: Vice President of the Komar University</td>
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<th><strong>The Head of the Raparin and Garmyan Independent Administrations</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>*Abdulhamid Abdullah Abdulrahman: The Head of the Independent Raparin Administration.</td>
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<td>*Salah al-Din Mohammed (Salah Kwekha): The Head of the Independent Garmyan Administration</td>
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<th><strong>Halabja Deputy Governor</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>*Ali Osman Ali</td>
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